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EMINENT DOMAIN-TEXAS SUPREME
COURT REQUIRES COMMON CARRIER
PIPELINE COMPANIES TO
DEMONSTRATE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF FUTURE PUBLIC
Sam Pinkston*
IN Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas,
LLC, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed the ability of private
pipeline companies to receive classification as common carriers from
the Texas Railroad Commission, thus allowing them to exercise eminent
domain powers in the construction of pipelines.' Overturning a Beau-
mont Court of Appeals decision, the court held that a pipeline company
cannot establish as a matter of law that it is a common carrier without
presenting reasonable proof "demonstrating that the pipeline will indeed
transport 'to or for the public for hire' and is not 'limited in [its] use to
the wells, stations, plants, and refineries of the owner." 2 Although the
court sought to protect the rights of private landholders,3 the decision
overlooks well-established principles of common carrier classification in
Texas, and future application of the court's decision promises to be
problematic.
Denbury Resources is a public corporation and the sole owner of
Denbury Operating Company.4 Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas LLC
("Denbury Green") is a subsidiary of Denbury Operating Company.5
Denbury Resources and its affiliates (collectively "Denbury") are en-
gaged in tertiary recovery operations in Texas involving the injection of
CO 2 into existing wells. 6 In 2008, Denbury sought to construct a pipeline
to transport CO 2 from Mississippi to oil fields in Texas for use in recovery
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University;
B.A. 2011, The University of Texas at Austin.
1. See Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex., LLC (Denbury
Green II), 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
2. Id. at 204.
3. Id. ("Indeed, our Constitution and laws enshrine landownership as a keystone
right. . . .").





operations.7 Although Denbury planned to transport CO2 from its natu-
ral reserve in Mississippi through the pipeline, evidence on the record
suggested that the pipeline would also be used to move "anthropogenic"
CO2 manufactured by third parties.8 In March of that year, Denbury
Green applied with the Texas Railroad Commission ("TRC") to operate
a CO 2 pipeline, as a common carrier, from the Texas-Louisiana border to
Brazoria and Galveston Counties.9 In accordance with Chapter 111 of the
Texas Natural Resources Code (the "TNRC"), Denbury Green indicated
on its application that it would be transporting gas "[o]wned by others,
but transported for a fee," and submitted a letter accepting and expressly
agreeing to be subject to a common carriers duties and obligations-
among them, the obligation to avail the pipeline to use by third parties.'0
On April 2, 2008, the TRC granted Denbury Green a permit to operate a
C02 pipeline as a common carrier."
Texas Rice Land Partners Ltd. ("Texas Rice") owns an interest in two
tracts crossed by the proposed pipeline. 12 When Denbury Green sought
to condemn a pipeline easement across the land, Texas Rice refused en-
try.13 Denbury Green sued for an injunction allowing access to the land,
and both sides subsequently filed for summary judgment. 14 Texas Rice
attested that the pipeline was not a common carrier because it was for the
exclusive use of Denbury, thus the use of eminent domain powers
amounted to a "private taking" of property.15 The trial court disagreed,
finding that pursuant to Chapter 111 of the TNRC, Denbury Green is a
common carrier, it has the authority to condemn under the power of emi-
nent domain, and Texas Rice is permanently enjoined from interfering
with Denbury Green's right to enter and survey.16
Relying on the facts that (1) Denbury Green accepted the duties and
obligations of a common carrier as required by Chapter 111 and that (2)
the pipeline was available for public use "from the outset," the court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.' 7 In its opinion, the court
concluded that Denbury Green had established its common carrier status





10. Id. at 196.
11. Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Tex. LLC (Denbury
Green 1), 296 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009), rev'd, 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex.
2012), reh'g denied.





17. Denbury Green I, 296 S.W.3d 877, 880-881 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009), rev'd,
363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
18. Id. at 881.
19. Denbury Green II, 363 S.W.3d at 192.
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TNRC § 111.019(a) states that "[c]ommon carriers have the right and
power of eminent domain." 20 A person is a common carrier if he "owns,
operates, or manages, wholly or partially, pipelines for the transportation
of carbon dioxide . . . to or for the public for hire"; 21 however, because
the taking of property for private use does not stand up to constitutional
scrutiny, such status is not granted if the pipelines are "limited in their
use to the wells, stations, plants, and refineries of the owner." 22 Simply
put, a company cannot claim common carrier status with regard to a pipe-
line unless that pipeline is available for "public use." In Housing Author-
ity of Dallas v. Higginbotham, the Texas Supreme Court articulated that
whether a use is public or private depends solely on the availability to the
public rather than the number of citizens who actually exercise a right to
the use.23
Whether a pipeline company is a common carrier is a question of law.2 4
In Vardeman v. Mustang Pipeline Co., the Tyler Court of Appeals recog-
nized that courts have been "instructed by the supreme court to give
great weight to the TRC's determination of that issue." 25 Accordingly,
the Vardeman Court ruled that a letter from the TRC declaring that Mus-
tang Pipeline Co. ("Mustang") met the Chapter 111 requirements for
common carrier status and evidence that Mustang held itself out for hire
by filing a tariff outlining public rates for transmission were sufficient to
establish as a matter of law that the pipeline company was a common
carrier.26
In Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas,
LLC, the Texas Supreme Court diverged from precedent such as Varde-
man, ruling that a TRC permit certifying that Denbury Green had agreed
to subject itself to the duties and obligations of a common carrier under
Chapter 111, in addition to the publishing of a public rates tariff by the
company, were insufficient to establish that the company was a common
carrier.27 The court determined that because the CO 2 transported by the
Denbury Green pipeline was to be used by Denbury Green subsidiaries,
the company was not a common carrier absent evidence that the pipeline
would also be used for the benefit of third parties. 28 According to the
court, the traditional process of granting common carrier status to pipe-
line companies based upon their own written commitment opens a door-
way for the "gaming of the permitting process," in which a company can
20. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a) (West 2011).
21. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6) (West 2011).
22. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.003(a) (West 2011).
23. Hous. Auth. of Dall. v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. 1940); see
also Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer, 653 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, writ. ref'd n.r.e.).
24. Vardeman v. Mustang Pipeline Co., 51 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001,
pet. denied).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 313.
27. Denbury Green II, 363 S.W.3d 192, 204 (Tex. 2012).
28. Id. at 202.
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claim that a pipeline is open to the public even where there is no reasona-
ble expectation that the pipeline will be used by the public. 2 9 Such prac-
tice, in the opinion of the court, amounts to a wielding of the eminent
domain power for private use.30
Before determining when a pipeline serves a "public use," the court
demonstrated that the TRC permit granting eminent domain power (re-
ferred to as a "T-4 permit") does not conclusively establish status as a
common carrier. 31 The court reasoned that "[n]othing in the statutory
scheme indicates that the Commission's decision to grant a common-car-
rier permit carries conclusive effect and thus bars landowners from dis-
puting in court a pipeline company's naked assertion of public use." 32
Moreover, the court concluded that the TRC's process for granting T-4
permits "[ ]takes no effort" to confirm that an applicant's pipeline is in-
tended for public use; thus allowing an irrefutable presumption of com-
mon carrier status to flow from the grant of a T-4 permit would
irresponsibly imperil private property.33
After finding that the TRC's grant of a T-4 permit does not preclude a
landowner from challenging the eminent domain power of a permit
holder, the court turned its attention to the "core constitutional concern"
of whether Denbury Green's pipeline serves a public or private use.3 4 In
its analysis, the court focused on TNRC § 111.002(6), which requires a
common carrier pipeline to (1) operate "to or for the public for hire" and
(2) file written acceptance agreeing to become "a common carrier subject
to the duties and obligations conferred or imposed by [Chapter 111]."3
Apparently disregarding the notion that a company's agreement to avail
its pipeline to the public is indeed an operation "for the public for hire,"
the court determined that Denbury Green failed to meet the first require-
ment of § 111.002(6).36 Because Denbury Green presented no evidence
that the CO 2 transported by the planned pipeline would be used by third
parties, the court reasoned that Denbury Green had not demonstrated
that the pipeline would be "for the public for hire," despite the fact that
Denbury Green agreed to make the pipeline available for public use and
posted a tariff of public use rates.37
Evident in the opinion is the court's fear that the requirements of
Chapter 111 will not prevent a pipeline company from exercising eminent
domain power, under color of the statute, for a purely private purpose. 38
To that end, the court perilously suggested the need to discern the legiti-
macy of a company's expectation that others will desire to use its not-yet-
29. Id. at 201.
30. Id. at 202.
31. Id. at 198-200.
32. Id. at 198.
33. Id. at 199.
34. Id. at 200.
35. Id. at 200-01.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 202.
38. Id. at 201-02.
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built pipeline.39 The court was quick to place the onus of proving this
unrealized event on the permit applicant.40 While such a requirement ap-
pears to far exceed the statutory framework put in place by the legisla-
ture, the Texas Supreme Court clung tight to the maxim that "statutes
granting eminent-domain power must be strictly construed in favor of the
landowner." 41 In a statement that will certainly frustrate the efficacy of
future pipeline development, Justice Willett concluded that "[i]f a land-
owner challenges an entity's common-carrier designation, the company
must present reasonable proof of a future customer, thus demonstrating
that the pipeline will indeed transport 'to or for the public for hire." 42
The court's holding in Denbury was incorrect because it (1) disregards
the precedent of judicial deference to TRC authority concerning the com-
mon carrier status of pipeline companies,43 (2) undermines the control-
ling provisions of the TNRC regarding common carriers,44 and (3)
contradicts well-established principles governing eminent domain in
Texas.45 As previously referenced, Texas courts have long recognized the
need to "give great weight" to determinations made by the TRC in decid-
ing if a pipeline company is a common carrier.46 Such great weight, in
fact, that traditionally courts have simply determined that "[w]hen the
evidence before the court indicates that a pipeline . . . has subjected itself
to the authority of the TRC to regulate its activities, then it is a common
carrier." 47 In a stark departure from this commitment, the court quickly
discounted the TRC's certification that Denbury Green had complied
with the common carrier statute, despite the fact that the TRC is the ad-
ministrative agency charged with its enforcement. 48
What is more troubling is the clear contradiction between the court's
position and well-established judicial principles governing the determina-
tion of "public use." Though much ado is made in the court's opinion
about whether third parties will actually use the planned pipeline, this
consideration is altogether irrelevant to determining whether a pipeline
serves a public use.4 9 Instead, the sole consideration in determining if a
39. Id. at 202.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 204.
43. State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. 1994); Vardeman v.
Mustang Pipeline Co., 51 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
44. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6) (West 2011).
45. Hous. Auth. of Dall. v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. 1940).
46. Vardernan, 51 S.W.3d at 312.
47. Id. at 313.
48. Denbury Green II, 363 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2012).
49. See West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. 976, 977-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1922,
writ ref'd) (holding that a railway used only to transport materials from a private mine
constituted a "public use," as it was required to "accept, transport, and deliver" materials
tendered by the public at any point in its line, and further finding immaterial that no public
use was ever effectuated); see also Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer, 653 S.W.2d
469, 475 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that a certain pipeline
constituted a "public use," regardless of the fact that at the time of condemnation, it was
only being used to transport the pipeline company's own gas).
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private project is for public use is the project's availability to the public,
as demonstrated by the Texas Supreme Court in Housing Authority of
Dallas v. Higginbotham:
It is immaterial if the use is limited to the citizens of a local neighbor-
hood, or that the number of citizens likely to avail themselves of it is
inconsiderable, so long as it is open to all who choose to avail them-
selves of it. The mere fact that the advantage of the use inures to a
particular individual or enterprise, or group thereof, will not deprive
it of its public character.50
Keeping with the common judicial commitment to this principle, the
court in Tenngasco expanded, stating that "Texas courts have made it
clear that it is the character of the right [to use a private project] which
inures to the public, not the extent to which the right is exercised, that is
important in evaluating enterprises which are involved in condemning
private property."51 Yet, the Texas Supreme Court directly contradicts
this principle by dismissing Denbury Green's commitment to making the
pipeline publicly available; instead, the court places determinative weight
on whether "gas is [actually] being carried for another." 52
While the court is seemingly concerned with what "the Legislature in-
tended,"53 its requirement that permit holders prove third-party use of
the proposed project effectively overrides the controlling power of TNRC
Chapter 111.54 Such a requirement goes well beyond what the Texas legis-
lature determined to be the appropriate process for granting common
carrier status to pipeline companies. Moreover, the powers of condemna-
tion are exercised prior to the construction of a project (and the acquisi-
tion of customers in most cases); thus requiring a permit holder to
provide proof of commercial relations prior to the existence of a product
is logically unsound and practically problematic.55
The development of pipelines in Texas is crucial given the state's fast
growing energy needs.56 To meet those needs, the state must have in
place an efficient administrative system that is able to facilitate the devel-
opment of pipelines without burdensome obstructions. The court's deci-
sion in Denbury will make it immensely difficult for future pipeline
developers to obtain and defend the common carrier status necessary to
place much-needed pipelines in Texas by forcing them to prove that an
unrealized pipeline will be used by members of the public. It requires
little imagination to conceive that with this decision, a massive increase in
private landowner challenges to common carrier status will begin to ap-
pear across the state. The conclusion seems certain that this recent deci-
50. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d at 84.
51. Tenngasco, 653 S.W.2d at 475.
52. Denbury Green II, 363 S.W.3d at 200.
53. Id. at 201.
54. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6) (West 2011).
55. Denbury Green II, 363 S.W.3d at 196.
56. Id. at 204.
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sion by the court will stand to complicate and frustrate the process of
pipeline development in Texas.
In Denbury, the Texas Supreme Court dramatically disrupted the ad-
ministration of pipeline development in Texas. The court abandoned the
long-developed practice of deferring to the TRC the adjudication of com-
mon carrier status, and it directly contradicted the long-honored principle
that "public use" ought to be determined by the availability of use rather
than whether the public has eventuated the actual use of a private work.
In the end, the court clung to the idea that eminent domain statutes must
be strictly construed in favor of landowners. While the sovereignty of pri-
vate ownership is indisputably important, it is clear that the court went
well beyond what is necessary-or even beneficial-in its pursuit of pro-
tecting the interests of Texas landowners.
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